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Abstract 
Bank efficiency is considered to be very important in the relationship between risk and capital. It affects both capital and risk and 
it is seen as one of the factors that determine them. On the other side, capital regulation and risk-taking behaviour influenced by it 
have an impact on efficiency. This paper gives an overview of theoretical and empirical studies that are going to be used on 
modelling the relationship between efficiency, capital and risk-taking behaviour of commercial banks operating in Albania 
during the period 2002-2014. Based on previous works worldwide, a three stage model is found to be a proper one for such 
analysis about Albanian banking system. According to this model:  first, the regression of efficiency and variables indicating risk 
and capital has to be analysed, second capital will be regressed against variables indicating efficiency and risk and in the third 
stage risk-taking will be regressed against variables indicating efficiency and capital. Based on previous studies related to this 
issue there are findings of a positive trade off between inefficiency and bank risk-taking (such as US evidences) and also negative 
one (such as European banks that seem to hold more capital and take on less risk in case of inefficiency). Defined independent 
factors of efficiency, capital and risk-taking are going to be used on an empirical study, subject of prospective research. To my 
knowledge there is no previous study on this issue for Albanian banking system. This model enables testing of different 
hypotheses about risk, capital, efficiency and relationship between them. It is going to respond to the effects that reduction in cost 
efficiencies might have on future risks of Albanian commercial banks. Furthermore, this model gives the possibility to test the 
bad management hypothesis and efficiency version of moral hazard hypotheses for targeted banks and banking system. It also 
responds to the questions whether bank cost efficiency makes the foundation of banks’ capital position and risk-taking and also 
whether there is an evidence of relationships between capital and risk-taking in line with moral hazard hypothesis.  
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1. Introduction 
Current Albanian banking system has his roots in 1992 after the collapse of a centralized economy. In 1992 
Albanian banking system started its operation in two levels.  In 2015 there are 16 banks operating in Albania which 
provide services like: deposits, accounts, transfers, loans, e-banking, etc. in a competitive environment. Banking 
sector is the main pillar of financial intermediation in Albania and a very important service industry. During 2014 
assets of banking sector constitute 91.7% of Gross Domestic Production and 5 banks (out of 16) that dominate this 
sector account for 68.4% of system credit portfolio and 73.4% of deposits. Being such a dominant part of the 
financial system makes its efficiency very crucial. In terms of providing country’s financial services, banking 
system has a monopoly position. The second component of the financial system is still in developing phase.   
Banking assets constitute for more than 95 percent of financial system’s assets.  They work according to the 
traditional business model and based on this they ensure simple financial structure and offer plain products and 
services. Their activity is exercised in a stringent and conservative regulatory environment strictly supervised by 
Bank of Albania.   Furthermore, efficient bank operation contributes to financial stability and ensures higher-quality 
services at low costs for enterprises and households. In this context, analyzing the efficiency and its determinant 
factors is important for both supervisory authorities and bank management. The first ones use it for the designation 
of regulatory framework while the second for drawing their business plans. In the frame of European banking 
industry, the process of financial integration is associated by the debate on the benefits of strengthened competition 
on credit markets and greater efficiency. Increase of competition in the banking sector forces banks to operate closer 
to the efficiency production function or in other words, closer to the “best practice”.  Besides this, competition is 
linked with risk-taking. Increased competition reduces the market power, decreases their charter value and so may 
lead banks to greater risk-taking. Regulators have tried to address this possible incentive of taking higher risks by 
capital requirements and appropriate supervision. Capital adequacy has taken a prominent role in the prudential 
regulatory process.  
Regarding these developments, there are a number of studies on the impact that capital, business models and 
operating efficiency have on bank risk. The recent credit crisis rises up the necessity of analyzing bank risk in the 
frame of enhanced bank efficiency and lower bank capital. Based on this, it is very important to assess firstly the 
impact of efficiency on bank risk. It can happen that because of low levels of efficiency, banks have the incentive to 
improve their performance by neglecting intensive monitoring of credit. From another perspective, changes on bank 
risks may influence backwards the efficiency levels. An increase on bank risk may lead to a decline on efficiency 
(cost efficiency) which results in reduction of credit screening.  
Secondly, it is very important to assess the impact that bank capital has on the relation between risk and 
efficiency. The level of capital might affect this relation. For instance, because of moral hazard problems banks 
might increase the incentives of lowering capitalization and undertake more risks that mean higher non-performing 
loans in the future. In the case of well-capitalized banks moral hazard problems may be lower and they can be both 
more efficient and prudent than low capitalized ones.  In the frame of capital costs, which are higher in the case of 
highly capitalized banks, maximization of revenues through increase of risk-taking level has to be taken in 
consideration.  
The Albanian financial system is based mainly on the banking sector. Non-bank financial sector is left in shadow 
and intermediation through it continues to be weak and unstructured. Based on this and also on the fact that banks in 
Albania stand in a monopoly sector position, the competition within financial system in Albania is more an intra 
sectorial rather than inter sectorial one. Albanian banking system has undergone 20 years of restructuring and during 
this period of time none of the banks has gone out of market. The study of bank sector efficiency makes it possible 
to find out what are the reasons for this.  It is because of the system’s high efficiency or because it has been paid 
more attention to protection than efficiency. Studying the relationship between risk-taking, capital levels and 
efficiency in the case of Albanian banking system is very important. While there are studies on the relationship 
between capital and risk for the Albanian banking system, to my knowledge, there is no study on the impact that 
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efficiency has to this relation. This papers analysis all possible variables to be used for the estimation of cost 
efficiency, bank capital and risk-taking.  
The objective of this work is to make an overview of literature (theoretical and empirical one) on the importance 
of efficiency on capital and risk-taking in the case of Albanian banking system and vice-versa, how efficiency is 
influenced by changes on risk-taking behavior because of capital regulation. It also aims to determine the variables 
that are going to be used in the model. Section two gives an overview of related literature, firstly on the relation 
between risk and capital and secondly on the influence that efficiency might have on this relation. The third section 
makes an analysis of the variables that are going to indicate efficiency, risk-taking and bank capital. Since the theory 
provides conflicting predictions to this relationship, the only way to examine it for the Albanian banking system is 
by an empirical analysis that is going to be presented on subsequent research papers.  Session three introduces the 
main hypotheses for the relationship between risk and capital and also discusses the methodology and data selected 
for  the upcoming empirical research, and in session 4 conclusions.  
2. Related literature 
Based on the theoretical literature, capital regulation is very important because it controls the risks taken by 
banks and also their solvency. The protection system of financial safety net may have negative effects on bank risk-
taking incentives and for this reason they cannot be considered as an accurate tool of prudential regulation. The most 
important role, among the different tools used for prudential purposes, has been played by capital adequacy 
regulations. However, in regard to the optimal design of capital adequacy regulation and its effects to bank risk-
taking, theoretical literature gives contradictory results. This means that there is no plain answer on whether higher 
capital ratios reduce bank’s risk taking level. On the other hand, capital adequacy regulation has to be synchronized 
with other regulatory and market instruments. Market discipline is very important when we come to the point of 
bank risk-taking and capital strength. If depositors are well informed they will require returns based on the risk 
taken over by bank. On the other side, banks will hold more capital to keep down insolvency risk. The situation is 
not the same when these depositors profit from tools of safety net or underestimate systemic risk. If this is the case, 
the increase on bank risk is not accompanied with the increase on capital hold for solvency risk.  
There are many theories on the relation between capital and risk. They use different financial models to evaluate 
this relation. The option pricing model introduces the idea that equity maximization value is connected with the 
maximization of the option value of deposit insurance, increase of leverage and of the asset risk. According to this: 
an increase on deposit liability is not associated with payment of default risk premium; increase of asset risk leads to 
the increase of managerial effect of this action; increase of leverage (decrease of equity capital) leads to the increase 
of managerial benefit from the increase of asset risk. If bank behavior tends to increase the deposit insurance the 
relation between capital and risk is going to be negative, whereas if the increase of the risk appetite dominates bank 
behavior the relation between risk and capital is positive.  
The early empirical literature that examines the effect of bank capital regulations on bank behaviour, Peltzman 
(1970), Mayne (1972) were focused on the effectiveness of financial regulation and more precisely on the impact 
that flat rate deposit insurance has on incentives for excessive risk-taking by bankers at the expense of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. Results from these studies show that bank manager’s target capital ratios were not 
affected by the requirements of the banking capital regulation and furthermore they suggest controlling the other 
factors to limit risk-taking.  
The introduction of the first Basel Accord (1988) on bank capital, initiated a number of studies on the effects of 
bank capital regulations. Ediz et al., (1997) found a positive influence of capital adequacy regulation on the increase 
of capital ratios although there has not been any shift to the riskier assets for their portfolios and off-balance sheet 
exposures.  
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) were the first who made a connection between empirical literature on bank capital 
regulation and studies related to bank efficiency. Following Hughes and Moon (1995), they emphasized the 
importance of efficiency when analyzing the relationship between bank capital and risk. They theoretical arguments 
were followed by studies that find bank risk-taking and moral hazard incentives determined by both efficiency and 
bank capital. Furthermore, in case of a banking system with different ownership structures, it is important to study if 
this relationship (capita-risk-efficiency) is influenced by this factor (ownership structure). This is what Goddard et 
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al., (2001), studied for European banking. Jansen and Meckling (1976) suggested that lack of capital market 
discipline has a negative impact to the owner’s control over the management and it gives to the managers the 
possibility of pursuing their own agenda and neglecting the issue of efficiency.  
Altunbas, Carbo, Gardener & Molyneux (2007), examined in their study the relationship between capital, risk 
and efficiency in European banking for the period 1992-2000. According to the results of empirical evidence banks 
with more capital tend to be less efficient and also the ones to take on excessive risk while they didn’t find any 
incentive to take on more risk in case of inefficient European banks. The results show a positive relationship 
between risk and capital level and the positive influence that financial strength of the corporate sector has in 
reducing capital levels and bank risk-taking. In the case of commercial and saving banks there are no major 
differences in this relationship while co-operative banks capital levels are inversely related to risks. According to 
Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez & Molyneux (2010) efficiency reduces risk-taking and capital improves efficiency.  
Above mentioned literature represents the relationship between bank cost efficiency, capital and risk-taking and 
we find out that risk-taking is positively affected by bank regulation, capital and deposit insurance. On the other 
hand, risk is negatively affected by bank size, managerial ownership, capital and loan growth.  
3. Hypotheses, model and data 
3.1. Main hypothesis between capital and risk  
Moral hazard problems coming up from the existence of a financial safety net, agency problems and the effects 
of regulatory actions are very important when analyzing the relationship between capital and risk. Main hypothesis 
on the relation between capital, risk and efficiency will be based on the contribution of these factors.  
The moral hazard hypothesis that arises in case of agency problems: Based on this hypothesis the relationship 
between capital and risk is negative. In case of high leverage position, capital decrease will be accompanied by 
increase on their risk level and that shows a negative relation between risk and capital. 
According to Modigliani and Miller theory firm’s earning power and the risk of its underlying assets lays down 
its market value. According to the basic idea of this theorem it doesn’t make any difference whether   investments of 
a firm are financed by equity or debt. This applies in terms of complete financial markets and perfectly informed 
depositors about bank’s risk to failure. Since the contribution of Modigliani and Miller (1958), researchers have 
studied how to reach an optimal capital structure by implications of deviations from the frictionless world that they 
assumed in their theory.  Later, Jensen and Meckling (1976) brought the concept of “agency theory”. They 
emphasize the conflict of interest between different contracting parties, principals and agents that are shareholders 
(owners), managers and equity holders. Since their seminal work, a vast literature can be found on explanations 
given to the nature of these conflicts of interests and also on the methods to solve them.  According to Jansen and 
Meckling (1976), the agency relationship can be defined as a contract between the principal and the agent. The 
entire cost of failure on pursuing goals is hold by managers while they can have only a fiction of the benefits.  
The moral hazard is present in the case of deposit insurance with full cover. This kind of deposit insurance does 
not reflect the asset risk and in this way banks have the incentives to increase riskiness of their portfolio. Benson et 
al. (1986) and Kane (1985) has analyzed the way how fixed-rate insurance stimulates risk-taking by banks. Merton 
(1977) and other authors have studied moral hazard due to deposit insurance. The extreme case of its implication is 
in zombie banks (Kane 1989).  
   Gorton and Rosen (1995) argue that managers will tend to take on more risks in periods of an unhealthy 
banking industry. Better capitalized banks have less moral hazard incentives. 
The contribution of regulators and supervisors influences a positive relationship between capital and risk. 
According to their requirements the increase of bank’s risk-taking level has to be followed by the increase of the 
capital hold to cover these risks. Required additional capital buffer in case of banks with higher level of risks 
enables them to avoid the costs of issuing equity at short notice. 
Bank efficiency level may impact future bank risk. Furthermore, decline in efficiency will lead to an increase in 
bank’s risk. It is supposed to be a negative relationship between risk and efficiency in case of exogenous events. 
Such events increase problem loans, increase risks and in respond banks have to pay additional costs and managerial 
efforts. According to this an increase in bank risk is expected to decline cost efficiency.  
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Summarizing all above, risk, capital and efficiency are all interrelated and the modelling of the relationship 
between capital and risk has to involve bank efficiency.  
3.2. Methodology and data 
The discussions on efficiency are based on the stochastic efficient frontier production methodology developed by 
Aigner et al (1997). Cost efficiency can be defined as a measure to evaluate whether bank costs come from the best 
practices related to costs, best combination of inputs out of all possible ones for production of the same output at the 
same conditions.  Estimation of cost efficiency can be through non-parametric and parametric techniques. Non-
parametric techniques in cost efficiency estimation require techniques of linear programming. Meanwhile, based on 
parametric techniques cost efficiency derives from a cost function wherein variable costs depend on input prices, 
quantity of output variables, random error and inefficiency. Based on duality theory, in certain conditions (e.g 
exogenous prices or out of managerial control, and optimal behavior of producer), characteristics of production 
function (economies of scale or economies of scope) can be indirectly drawn from the use of cost or profit function. 
Based on Aigner, Lovel and Schmit (1997) and Meeusen and Broeck (1977) cost function of a firm is:  
 
TCb = C (Qi,Pj,εb) b=1,…..,n           (1) 
 
Where Cb is bank total operational cost,  Qi represents the vector of quantity of bank output variables, Pj is the 
vector of prices of bank input variables, εb represents the compound random error.   
Compound random error term consists of two parts as presented below:  
 εb =   ub +    eb                          (2) 
Where, ub refers to the endogen factors while eb refers to the exogenous factors that influence bank production 
cost. In this way, term ub shows an increase on bank production cost because of the inefficiency factor which may 
result from an error in management. As such we can mention the irrational use of the quantity of inputs for given 
prices. On the other side, the second component of compound random error, eb, represents a contemporary increase 
or decrease on bank costs as the result of random factors that flows from mistakes on data’s, on measurement of 
unexpected or uncontrolled factors. As such we can mention time, strikes, wars and other factors that are not 
influenced by changes on the methods of management.    
To make easy the measurement, ub and eb are supposed to be separable from the other part of the cost function 
and both sides of the equation (1) can have a logarithmic form: 
 
lnTCb = f (Qi,Pj) + lnub + lneb                  (3) 
 
Where f, represents the form of cost function and eb= lnub + lneb represents components of the error term. It is the 
last part of the equation that makes the difference between parametric and non-parametric techniques of efficiency, 
the way how we decompose the error term. Non-parametric approach are based on the assumption that there is no 
error coefficient and in this way every deviation from the best way of combination of inputs to produce in an 
efficient way the outputs is considered as part of inefficiency. Meantime, parametric techniques are based on the 
assumption that inefficiency has an asymmetric design which in most of the cases is half normal while random 
errors has a symmetric distribution, in most of the cases normal standard. 
Estimation is conducted using a maximum likelihood procedure. The efficiency model is written as follows:  
 
        2     3  2    2        3    3 
Ln(TC) = ∑ αi LnQi +    ∑ βi LnPi  +  ½  [ ∑ ∑  δij LnQiLnQi +   ∑ ∑  λij LnPiLnPj ] +  
      i=1  j=1   i=1 j=1         i=1 j=1 
 
  
2   2        3    3                  3   2 
 +  ½   [ ∑ ∑  δij LnQiLnQi +   ∑ ∑ δij LnPiLnPi ] + ∑ ∑  ρij LnPiLnQj  + e 
  i=1 j=1      i=1 j=1                 i=1 j=1 
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Banks will be considered as multi production firms, 2 outputs and 3 inputs.  Input vector is compound by: (1) 
price of funds p1;  (2) price of labour,  x2 and (3) price of physical capital, x3. Output vector, based on the assumption 
that it represents the real portfolio of products and services of banks that operates in Albania, is compounded by: (1) 
total loans, q1; (2) other earning assets,  q2.  
This study is based on previous empirical findings that consider bank efficiency as a key component for bank 
management while investigating the relationship between cost efficiency, risk-taking and bank capital. A system of 
equations will be used to enable estimation of their interrelationships. The modelling framework is based on various 
approaches suggested by Shrives and Dahl (1992) Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) and Altunbas et al. (2007). Table 1 
presents the empirical model for the three-stage last squares to estimate the relationship between efficiency, capital 
and risk-taking.  
Table 1Empirical Model of the Three-Stage Least Square (3SLS) 
Depencand Variable Model  
EFFICIENCY (EFF) EFF=α0 ETA + α1 LTA + α2 LASSET + α3 LDR + α4 
RISK + α5 PERSTEX + α6FIXTAS + α7 CIR+ α8 
EGRW + α9CORRUPT + α10FREE  
Equation (1) 
CAPITAL (ETA)  ETA= α0 LTA + α1 EFF + α2LASSET + α3 RISK + α4 
OBSA α5+ α6 CIR + α7 FIXTAS + α8 ROA + α9 
EGRW α10 CORRUPT + α11 FREE 
Equation (2) 
RISK-TAKING (LTA) LTA= α0 ETA + α1 EFF + α2 LASSET + α3 RISK + α4 
ROA + α5 PERSTEX + α6 DEPTA + α7 OBSA + α8 
EGRAW + α9 CORRUPT + α10 FREE 
Equation (3) 
 
Equation 1 in Table 1 employs cost efficiency (EFF) as dependant variable. Table 2 gives explanations on the 
independent variables that are going to be used for its estimation. 
 
Table 2 Independent variables of capital (ETA) 
Indicator  Description  
ETA Equity to total asset 
LTA Loan to total asset 
LASSET Logarithmic asset size 
LDR Loan deposit ratio 
RISK Loan losses provision to total loan 
PERSTEX Personnel exp. to total expenses 
FIXTAS Fixed asset to total asset ratio 
CIR Cost to income ratio 
EGRW Annual economic growth 
CORRUPT Corruption index 
FREE Economic freedom index 
 
Equation 2 in Table 1 employs Bank capital as dependant variable. Table 3 gives explanations on the independent 
variables that are going to be used for its estimation. 
Table 3: Independent variables of capital (ETA) 
Indicator Description 
LTA Loan to total asset 
EFF Cost efficiency 
LASSET Assets Logarithm            
RISK Loan losses provision to total loan 
OBSA Off-balance sheet activities to total asset 
CIR Cost to income ratio 
FIXTAS Fixed asset to total asset ratio 
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ROA Return on asset 
EGRW Annual economic growth 
CORRUPT Corruption index 
FREE Economic freedom index 
 
Equation 3 in Table 1 employs Bank risk-taking level as dependant variable. Table 4 gives explanations on the 
independent variables that are going to be used for its estimation. 
Table 4: Independent variables of risk-taking (LTA) 
Indicator Description 
ETA Equity to total asset 
EFF Cost efficiency 
LASSET Logaritmimi i aseteve 
RISK Loan losses provision to total loan 
ROA Return on asset 
PERSTEX Personel exp. to total expenses 
DEPTA Deposit to total asset 
OBSA Off-balance sheet activities to total asset 
EGRAW Annual economic growth 
CORRUPT Corruption index 
FREE Economic freedom index 
 
The Albanian financial system is based mainly on the banking sector. Non-bank financial sector is left in shadow 
and intermediation through it continues to be weak and unstructured. Based on this and also on the fact that banks in 
Albania stand in a monopoly sector position, the competition within financial system in Albania is more an intra 
sectorial rather than inter sectorial one. Table 5 shows the share of each segments of financial system to GDP. As 
indicated in this table the Albanian financial system is dominated by banking system. Albanian banking system has 
undergone 20 years of restructuring and during this period of time none of the banks has gone out of market. The 
study of bank sector efficiency makes it possible to find out what are the reasons for this.  Studying the relationship 
between risk-taking, capital levels and efficiency in the case of Albanian banking system is very important. While 
there are studies on the relationship between capital and risk for the Albanian banking system, to my knowledge, 
there is no study on the impact that efficiency has to this relation.  
Table 5: Share of financial segments to GDP (2008-2014) 
Licencing ans 
Supervisory 
Authority  
Financial system 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Bank of Albania Banking sector 76.7 77.5 80.9 84.7 89.6 90.5 91.7 
Non-bank institutions 1.7 2.2 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.7 
SLAs and their Unions 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Albanian Financial 
Supervisory 
Authority 
Insurance Companies 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 
Pension funds  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Investment funds     1.21 3.7 4.5 
Financial 
intermediation 
 80.5 82.01 85.81 89.41 95.93 99.13 101.44 
 
The Albanian banking sector has undergone many changes that have influenced developments on banking sector 
per group-bank. Banks are classified in three main groups G1, G2, G3. Criteria’s for such classification have been: 
ownership of bank capital and size of bank assets.  
The criterion of capital ownership is used till 2003 yr. According to this criterion banks were classified as: 
a. Banks with state capital (G1) 
b. Banks with common capital (G2) 
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c. Banks with private capital (G3) 
In 2004 yr. banking sector is totally owned by private stockholders and this changes the criterion used on 
classifying banks.  From this year onwards the structure of banking sector is determined by the size of bank assets. 
Based on the ratio of bank assets market value by banking sector total value of assets, banks can be part of three 
main groups: 
a. Banks that own less than 2% of the total value of banking sector assets (G1-group of small banks) 
b. Banks that own more than 2% but less than 7% of total value of banking sector assets (G2 – middle size 
banks) 
c. Banks that own more than 7% of total value of banking sector (G3 – group of big banks) 
 
4. Conclusions 
Albanian financial systems is dominated and identified by banks because its assets account for more than 95 
percent. Its role is very important to the economic stability and soundness. Relied on theoretical and empirical 
approaches there are studies on the relationship between risk and capital for the Albanian banking system and also 
on the dynamics of bank efficiency either for the whole banking system or for individual banks that are part of it.  
Theoretical studies are not conclusive on the effect that more stringent capital requirements have on bank 
efficiency. Capital requirements enhance financial stability and improve bank efficiency by using larger capital as 
buffer and by lowering moral hazard. There are also arguments that higher capital requirement may enhance 
excessive risk-taking. Most empirical evidences suggest that more stringent capital regulation may lead to lower 
riskiness of bank assets because it reduces bank’s exposure to systemic risk. On the other hand, there are studies 
that don’t find strong the linkage between capital requirement and bank risk. Banks can respond to higher risk-
weighted capital requirements by raising equity, cutting down lending or reducing asset risk. The way how banks 
choose to respond to capital requirements really matters. Each of these alternatives gives different impact to the 
economic growth. What is the way that banks operating in Albania react to higher risk-weighted capital 
requirements and the impact that their choice will have to the economic growth will be the object of following 
papers. The theoretical and empirical literature presented in this paper will support their assessments and 
explanations of regressions that might be found. The relation between risk and capital is found to be positive and 
simultaneous. The analysis of the efficiency cost shows the presence of inefficient banks in Albania. While 
analyzing the relationship between capital and risk, it is very important to take in consideration bank efficiency. 
The level of bank efficiency is very important to and determines both capital and risk. Nevertheless, the capital 
regulation and risk-taking behavior influenced by it has its impact to efficiency. It can either increase or decrease 
efficiency. Based on literature, there are five different approaches concerning measurement of banking output. 
The determination of the independent variables for estimation of X-efficiency in case of Albanian banking system 
is going to be according to the asset (intermediation) approach which considers loans and other assets as bank 
outputs while deposits and other liabilities are bank inputs. Relying to previous theoretical and empirical literature 
a three stage model will be used for a set of 16 banks for the period 2002-2014. First, the regression of efficiency 
and variables indicating risk and capital will be analyzed, second capital is regressed against variables indicating 
efficiency and risk and in the third stage risk-taking is regressed against variables indicating efficiency and 
capital. This model will help on answering the questions whether bank cost efficiency is making the foundation of 
banks’ capital position and risk-taking and also whether there is an evidence of relationships between capital and 
risk-taking in line with moral hazard hypothesis.  
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